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Murnaghan: Tribute to Judge Sprouse

TRIBUTE TO JUDGE SPROUSE
FRANCIS D. MURNAGHAN, JR.

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
Judge
Stating reasons why Judge James M. Sprouse has made a deep,
a lasting, and a most favorable impression on me is not difficult. Judge
Sprouse came on the Fourth Circuit at nearly the same time that I did.
Almost immediately an animated controversy arose in the Court over
whether an en banc rehearing should be held. The theretofore members
of the Court had been equally divided, so interest was directed as to
how Judge Sprouse and I would vote. Actually, he and I both voted to
rehear en banc, a decision which most, if not all, concerned about the
matter would ordinarily take to mean that an en banc hearing should
take place. However, not everything involving mathematics is as simple
as it seems. Another tie vote was announced. The way each judge had
voted was not publicly disclosed. Only the total vote was announced.
The general assumption was that where the vote was originally equally
divided it would remain so, hence when two votes were added the two
votes must have been split. My vote - which was in favor of rehearing en banc - became known, while Judge Sprouse's vote was not
publicly announced. It was therefore assumed that he must have voted
against rehearing en banc. That sounds logical, doesn't it? Adding one
to each side of an equally divided court should leave it equally divided. But that approach overlooked something. One of the theretofore
existing court changed his vote so that Judge Sprouse and I, by our
votes, only managed to restore equal division. The result was that a
highly placed political figure, a governor of a state, lost his chance to
secure reversal of his conviction. That decision was subsequently reversed by the United States Supreme Court, suggesting that Judge
Sprouse may have had the right of it, no very surprising thing. However, there are numerous other examples of that, and I mention the matter for a different reason. The news media hounded Judge Sprouse,
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suggesting that he had voted negatively and insisting on an explanation.
Instead of becoming annoyed, he gave a simple, straightforward reply,
explaining what had happened, and not disclosing whose change of
vote caused the situation to arise. He thus brought newspaper curiosity
to a close.
Thus, it was that my relationship with Judge Sprouse essentially
got under way with succinct and abundant proof that he knew how to
handle things effectively. Since then, there have been many other examples of his effectiveness as a judge.
I should like to refer to one in particular. When Judge Sprouse
and I came on the Court, Judge Clement Haynsworth was the Chief
Judge. In addition to his frequently demonstrated ability to craft first
rate opinions, Judge Haynsworth, by quiet but persistent example, practiced and urged all of us to practice collegiality toward other members
of the Court. It may have taken a greater while for me to catch on but
for the fact that Judge Sprouse, from the moment I first laid eyes on
him, practiced quiet collegiality with everyone on the Court. He thereby speeded my recognition of how important it is to be able to disagree without being disagreeable.
First rate opinions were not exclusively to be credited to Judge
Haynsworth, however, because Judge Sprouse imitated him in writing
first rate opinions also. His first published opinion as a member of the
Fourth Circuit, United States v. Workman, 617 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1980),
convincingly demonstrated that Judge Sprouse was up to the job. In
that decision, he held that it was error to allow a prisoner to be held
liable for the time during which revocation of his parole was being
appealed, where the appeal eventually led to the overturning of the
revocation.
It is obviously impossible to list all of Judge Sprouse's adroit
opinions issued in the 16 years he has served on the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals. I shall confme myself to that one early case and one
late one to demonstrate that Judge Sprouse began expertly and carried
on in exactly the same way.
Recently, Judge Sprouse wrote Ristow v. South Carolina Ports
Authority and the SS UNKNOWN, 27 F.3d 84 (4th Cir 1994), vacated
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and remanded by the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision, 115 S. Ct. 567
(1994), for further consideration in light of Hess v. Port Authority
Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994). Hess involved a bistate
railway. In Ristow, involving a one state authority and a phantom
ocean-going ship, Judge Sprouse succinctly disposed of claims against
an unserved and unidentified defendant, and then went on to tackle a
tangled question of Eleventh Amendment immunity for an agency,
determining that the agency involved was an arm of the state and thus
immune. On remand, the Ristow case will clearly be a closely divided
one, requiring the intricately close attention which it received from
Judge Sprouse.
Judge Sprouse will be greatly missed. Following 16 years of
unrelenting effort, Judge Sprouse, on stepping down, makes us aware
how sorely we will miss the unique qualities brought to our Court by
such an accomplished jurist. It may be grammatically incorrect to refer
to someone as "more perfect" but here greater - and indeed greatest
- are in fact quite correct.
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